TITLE: ``Goals, Preferences and Ceteris Paribus Comparatives''

ABSTRACT:

Normal use of comparative relationships, including relative probability, desirability (preference), height, seaworthiness, and others, covers both relations among individuals, for which the meanings are straightforward, and relations among classes of individuals, for which a variety of interpretations are possible.

This talk presents a theory of meaning and inference for generic comparatives that lifts comparisons of individuals to comparisons of classes ``other things being equal'' by means of {\em contextual equivalences}, equivalence relations among individuals that vary with the context of application. We show how the novel semantical basis aids in the incremental capture and exploitation of comparatives in automated reasoning systems by permitting one to construct appropriate representations from the data, rather than hypothesizing representations prior to information capture.

Applied to preferences, the theory provides a common semantical framework linking the AI planning notion of ``goal'' with the decision-theoretic notion of ``utility'', interpreting goals as preference {\em ceteris paribus}, and provides an interesting alternative to previous logics of preference (von Wright, Hansson).

This work stems from collaborations with Michael Wellman and Yoav Shoham.

Everyone is welcome to attend.

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